时间：2019年10月23日（周三下午），15:00-17:05

地点：学院南路学术会堂603会议室

研讨会详细议程：

15:30-16:30

报告一：Earnings Management via Not-wholly-owned Subsidiaries

报告人：张新一（清华大学）

摘要：We explore a new mechanism of earnings management whereby a parent company shifts income from not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to itself to avoid losses. Consolidated net income attributable to the parent company increases if earnings are shifted from not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to the parent, as the parent company enjoys the full amount of earnings shifted rather than sharing earnings with minority investors. In general, net income and noncontrolling interest in subsidiary earnings exhibit a strong positive correlation, suggesting that a firm’s earnings performance tends to co-move with its subsidiaries’ earnings. However, this positive relation turns significantly negative for firms just meeting or beating zero earnings, indicating that firms opportunistically decrease earnings of not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to manage consolidated net income to avoid losses. Income shifting from subsidiaries to the parent firm is mainly driven by firms with a very large percentage of noncontrolling ownership. In addition, related-party transactions and concurrent appointment of a parent’s top management member to subsidiaries’ management team play a complementary role in facilitating such income shifting. Overall, our evidence not only demonstrates a new mechanism of earnings management via not-wholly-owned subsidiaries, but also highlights the negative consequences to minority investors of income shifting from subsidiaries to the publicly listed company.

16:35-17:35

报告二：Does the One-Child Policy Impede Innovation in China? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

报告人：唐菂（厦门大学）

摘要：We analyze how the one-child policy (OCP) in China affects firm innovation. The OCP was intensively enforced from January 1980, causing a sharp increase in the single-child ratio among CEOs just born after this policy cutoff. Exploiting this discontinuity and using a Regression Discontinuity Design framework, we find that single-child CEOs lead to significant decreases in firm innovation. A separate, difference-in-differences analysis around the CEO turnover confirms this finding. We find that single-child CEOs are less willing to take risks by making significant R&D investments. Our findings indicate that radical population control policy impede innovation in China.

报告人简介：

张新一，清华大学经济管理学院会计学博士研究生，在学期间曾赴美国南加州大学Leventhalbwin体育必赢访学。研究方向为会计信息与资本市场、公司治理。曾在《管理世界》等期刊发表过论文。

唐菂，厦门大学管理学院财务学系博士研究生，佛罗里达州立大学联合培养博士。研究方向为公司财务、公司治理、企业创新、企业并购、以及社交媒体。曾在《经济研究》期刊发表论文。